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Today, fifty years after the end of the Warren Court and the start of the criminal
procedure revolution, the United States criminal justice system is in crisis. Our
incarceration rate over the ensuing years has risen dramatically as the following
chart from the Sentencing Project2 makes clear:

1. This article is a shortened version of Chapter 2 of The Supreme Court’s Role in Mass Incarceration
(forthcoming Routledge).
* William T. Pizzi is Professor of Law Emeritus at the University of Colorado Law School. He is a
graduate of Harvard Law School and was a federal prosecutor in the District of New Jersey before joining the
faculty at Colorado Law where he taught for thirty-five years. He is one of the foremost scholars in the United
States on comparative criminal procedure issues. He has lectured abroad for both the Ford Foundation and the
United States Information Agency.
2. Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject.org/criminaljustice-facts/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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The chart shows our prison population historically starting in 1925 and
continuing until 2017. What is, of course, shocking is the steep increase in the
U.S. prison population that begins in the mid-1970s and continues sharply
upward for the next few decades until 2009 when the number levelled off and
there is a slight decline in the last several years.
In 2017, U.S. prisons held 1,439,808 citizens. But this understates our
incarceration problem because we have many more citizens incarcerated because
the chart does not include those being held in jails in the United States. In 2019,
there were an additional 612,000 citizens in our jails. Adding together those in
prison and those in our jails, the total is more than two million citizens
incarcerated.
It would be easier to understand the sharp and sustained rise in our
incarceration rate over the last forty years if it were a common phenomenon
among other western countries. But other western countries have incarceration
rates that have held rather steady over the period when our rate rose sharply. The
press has given quite a bit of attention to this contrast between the U.S.
incarceration rate and the rates in other countries. The New York Times, for
example, published a front-page article in 2008 on the topic complete with an
interactive chart that allowed readers to click on different countries around the
world and compare incarceration rates.3 When a reader did so, it was clear why
3. Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
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the headline of the article intoned that Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other
Nations’.
The article noted—what is clear from the above chart—that from 1925 to
1970, the rate was stable at roughly 110 people in prison per 100,000 people.
After 1970, the incarceration rate began to significantly increase.4
Similarly, in 2010, the Economist featured a cover story on the extreme
U.S. incarceration rate, featuring a drawing of Lady Liberty looking balefully out
from behind the bars of a cell.5 The article stated that “[n]o other rich country is
nearly as punitive as the Land of the Free,” and as proof of that fact, the article
noted that the United States incarceration rate was five times greater than
Britain’s, nine times greater than Germany’s and twelve times greater than in
Japan’s.6
The typical response to the disparity in incarceration rates blame this
terrible situation on one or two of several factors: “It was the war on drugs” or “It
was harsh sentencing laws.” What you will never hear is: “Unfortunately, our
criminal procedure revolution stemming from the Warren Court years failed.”
This article asserts precisely the last point: an important factor in our escalating
incarceration rate was the failure of the criminal procedure revolution.
Now let me quickly put my argument in perspective. I am not absolving
our drug laws or our harsh sentencing laws of any blame in our present crisis.
Nor am I saying the criminal procedure revolution “caused” our incarceration
rate to rise. There were many factors in the rise. What I am saying is that for too
long we have preferred to avoid a topic that is painful to many who grew up in
the Warren Court era—that not everything the Court did turned out well. I
include myself in this group. As a law student, then a prosecutor, and then a
“baby” professor, I could see little wrong with many of the Court’s decisions.
But as I evolved into an elderly comparatist who has spent many hours in
courtrooms all around the world, I now have a different perspective on what the
Court did.
This article will discuss one way in which we differ from other common
law countries—the Court’s expansion of the right to jury trial to misdemeanors in
Baldwin v. New York7 in 1970.
But before I talk about that case and the issues involved, I want to
explain why the criminal procedure revolution was always going to be very risky.
Section I of this article will discuss the risks of constitutional rulemaking.
Section II will discuss the importance of trials for keeping incarceration rates in

Review).
4. Id.
5.
Rough
Justice,
THE
ECONOMIST
(July
22,
2010),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2010/07/22/rough-justice (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
6. Id.
7. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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check. Section III will then turn to Baldwin and explain how the insistence that
misdemeanors be tried to a jury was a serious mistake.
I. THE RISKS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULEMAKING
A. The Limits of a Constitutional Case
When criminal cases go to the Supreme Court, the Court knows what
happened to this particular defendant, the issues that were raised, and what the
lower court rulings were. Litigation is meant to sort out the facts of the case and
determine who did what to whom and why. But when the Court is making
constitutional rulings that will apply across the country, the narrow focus of
traditional litigation is a problem.
The case before the Court may be dramatic but the Court will often not
know with precision (a) how often this problem comes up; (b) how serious it
usually is (compared to the case up for review); and (c) whether the problem
occurs only in a few states or many.
The Court will, of course, have two argumentative briefs in front of it
and may have some amicus briefs from others—but they are usually written from
a partisan perspective. These briefs will vary in quality and they are not written
with the goal of painting a complete picture of the issue. Indeed, the lawyers
writing the briefs may have no idea exactly how often the problem before the
Court arises.
Obviously, there will be cases where the Court is simply deciding
whether the ruling in the case below was correct, e.g., was the confession
voluntary or was the officer justified in stopping the suspect. But, when the Court
is making a more sweeping ruling, especially one that requires additional
hearings, the limits of the case are a risk. The Court may be adding significant
expense for a problem that may often not be serious.
B. The Court’s Lack of Expertise
When a legislative body (or an administrative agency) is considering
adopting a certain rule, it can commission neutral studies of the issue or hold
public hearings where experts of all stripes can give their opinions and be
questioned about those opinions. It can gather the neutral expertise that
individual legislators don’t possess.
The Court itself also possesses very limited expertise on many of
criminal procedure issues it faces. Some justices have typically been chosen from
one of the federal appellate benches or they may even have been a federal trial
judge. But how many have been state court judges or spent any time in
misdemeanor courtrooms? How many have been public defenders or
prosecutors? How many have trial experience? Or are familiar with how the
private defense makes a living?
826
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Supreme Court justices, of course, have a bevy of smart young law clerks
at their disposal that can research any legal issue to find cases going back to the
start of the republic. But they typically have no experience in the field.
The Court’s lack of expertise is fine when it is making major moral
decisions on important issues or interpreting a federal statute (which Congress
can easily amend). But, when the Court is making rules about the questioning of
suspects and where such questioning should take place, it lacks expertise.
Sometimes the lack of expertise, or even a certain naivete, shows itself in
their opinions. In Miranda v. Arizona,8 where the Court announced that the Fifth
Amendment requires a right to counsel for arrestees prior to questioning at a
police station, the opinion states; “If the accused decides to talk to his
interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of
untrustworthiness . . . . The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that
the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police . . . .”9
This image of a lawyer called to an interrogation room and then helping
the arrestee to make a statement to the police is completely unrealistic. If you are
a public defender and are called to the police station to assist someone arrested
for murder and the arrestee says, “I want to confess. I did it.” You haven’t looked
at any police reports because they haven’t been written. You don’t know the
evidence, you don’t know the arrestee, but according to the Court, you are going
to help the arrestee make a fully accurate statement to the police? The lawyer will
always say, “Don’t say anything. Let me study the evidence in the case and we
can decide together what to do. A full confession may be appropriate, but not at
this time. It won’t hurt to wait until I see the evidence and talk to the prosecutor.”
C. The Inability to Obtain Feedback on Proposed Rules, Requirements, or
Standards
One of the most serious problems the Court faces when deciding on a
rule intended to solve a problem is the inability to obtain feedback on a possible
rule. By contrast, an administrative agency or a legislative body can always seek
feedback on possible rules.
Perhaps, the rule the Court is contemplating will solve the problem, but
perhaps it is too narrow or too broad for the particular problem. Or, the rule may
impact courts or police officers in rural counties in a way that differs markedly
from the way it would impact courts and police forces in large cities.
Making a draft statute or a proposed regulation available for public
comment often improves the proposal and makes passage or adoption more likely
if possible negative impacts are brought to the attention of the drafters and the
proposed draft is amended to avoid or lesson such impacts.

8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).)
9. Id. at 470.
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The Supreme Court cannot get the same feedback, which increases the
risks of rules not working out as intended.
D. The Language of Constitutional Decisions
When the Court announces a decision imposing a rule that must be
followed by police, prosecutors, or judges in every police station or courthouse in
the country, the Court has to be strong and sweeping in the language it uses to
announce the rule. The Court has to find the procedure to be demanded by the
Constitution and to be obvious. The Court cannot say things like “This was the
best proposal on which we were able to get a majority to agree on” or “We think
this decision is supported by common law history but there is some evidence that
raises a doubt.” Instead, it must insist that the particular constitutional provision
on which it is basing its ruling “demands no less.”
What this means is that the Court tends to oversell its ruling and strongly
commits to a rule or a standard that may not work out. At the same time, the
Court will often tend to denigrate the rule it is striking down and replacing. There
may be sound practical reasons why a state or a city adopted the rule being
struck, but they will be summarily dismissed as clearly insufficient to justify the
state procedure.
E. The Court’s Limited Options for Reform
The Supreme Court has only a very limited arsenal for solving a
particular problem. The Court doesn’t have the broad range of options that a
legislature possesses that might be used to avoid or limit the particular problem.
The Court cannot, for example, draft statutes or rules of procedure that might
prevent abuses or trial problems from occurring. It can’t command by
constitutional fiat, for example, that police officers wear body cameras and
require that they be turned on in certain situations.
Another area demonstrating the Court’s struggles because its reform
options are limited is that of is police lineups.10 Preventing the contamination of
witness identifications due to suggestive lineups remains a very serious problem
in the United States and it is a source of many false convictions.
Suggestive lineups might be severely limited if there were rules in place
that required: a certain minimum number of the people in the lineup, an
administrator with no prior knowledge of who the suspect might be, restrictions
on what should and should not be said to the witness before the lineup, mandated

10. Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (seemingly requiring the presence of counsel at
lineups to prevent suggestive lineups leading to false convictions), with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(noting that the Court narrowed the previous decision by limiting counsel to post-indictment lineups which are
rare occurrences). See Michael Vitiello, The Warren Court’s Eyewitness Identification Case Law: What if?, 51
U. PAC. L. REV. 867 (2020).
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use of video equipment, rules restricting the way statements should be taken from
a witness after the lineup, and so on. Such a set of rules would likely require
exceptions in certain situations such as the delicate health of a witness.
Good lineup procedures could foreclose many later problems, but the
Court can’t enact such legislation within the confines of a constitutional ruling.
The Court has only a broad brush with which to draw constitutional lines and it
would be hard to see how due process demands this precise set of sensible lineup
precautions.
Another area where the Court struggles because of its limited options for
preventing problems is jury selection. For example, prosecutors often try to
remove as many black prospective jurors as they can using peremptory
challenges. (Peremptory challenges are, of course, those challenges for which a
prosecutor or a defense attorney need not give an explanation.)
One way to limit the use of peremptory challenges to remove all black
jurors would be to limit sharply the number of peremptory challenges available.
What if the number were reduced to three or two in routine felony cases?
Peremptory challenges could still serve their function as a backup to challenges
for cause, but it would be much harder to remove systematically all the jurors of
a certain race or gender. A reduced number of peremptory challenges would also
help ensure a broader cross-section of citizens on juries even apart from race or
gender and it might also speed up laborious jury selection processes.
As sensible as a rule limiting peremptories might be, the Court simply
can’t dictate rules like this. Instead, when the Court addressed issues relating to
the abuse of peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,11 the Court’s options
were: (a) whether to make peremptories less “peremptory” or (b) whether to
abolish by constitutional fiat all peremptory challenges or (c) whether to do
nothing about the abuse of peremptories?
The Court chose option (a) which requires a delicate hearing to
determine whether a lawyer improperly used a challenge to remove a juror solely
on the basis of race. This is not an easy task where challenges are labelled
“peremptory” and lawyers can remove jurors for any reason except solely on the
basis of race. Batson is generally considered very ineffective in achieving its
purpose.12
F. Tackling Issues in Isolation from Other Issues
The narrow focus of Supreme Court decisions presents problems for
criminal procedure reform because the Court cannot tie together issues the way a
legislature can. Returning to the jury selection problem, one way to solve the
problem of the abuse of peremptory challenges on the basis of race might be to
11. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
12. Viewing Batson as ineffective, Justice Breyer has urged the Court to reconsider Batson and the
peremptory challenge system in its entirety. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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tie reform with another issue, such as nonunanimous jury verdicts. One
legislative compromise might be to abolish peremptory challenges but to permit
nonunanimous verdicts. For example, England abolished peremptory challenges,
but judges may accept a nonunanimous verdict of 10-2 after two hours of
deliberation.
There are many reasons to object to this proposal: will it lead to false
convictions? Why the number 10 and 2? Why not 9 and 3, or 8 and 4? Scotland
has juries of 15 and accepts verdicts of 8-7.13
But the point here is not the merits of this specific proposal but the way
in which issues can be tied together to reach something of a compromise. If this
were a legislative proposal, a state might set up a pilot project in a certain county
to see how the proposal works limiting it perhaps to less serious crimes where no
imprisonment will result. A pilot project would consider questions like: How
much time does it save? What percentage of cases end in unanimous versus
nonunanimous verdicts? What do judges who are handling the cases think? What
is the effect on the representativeness of juries? Etc.
Unfortunately, the Court doesn’t have the ability to tie issues together in
this way.
G. The Supreme Court and the Law of Unintended Consequences
Legislation, no matter how well intended, may turn out to be ineffective
in solving the problem it was intended to solve or it may have serious side effects
that were not anticipated.
In 2005, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 that mandated
the production of 7.5 billion gallons of ethanol by 2012. Two years later,
Congress upped the mandate to 15 billion gallons of ethanol by 2015.14 The
objectives of this legislation were to reduce our dependence on foreign oil, cut
greenhouse emissions, and reduce fuel costs to motorists.
There have been ways in which ethanol has achieved some of its
objectives, but the benefits have not been as great as anticipated and there have
been serious—or, more accurately, terrible negative consequences for the
environment.
Consider some of the unintended consequences of the law. First, the
United States accounts for 53% of world corn exports.15 When large amounts of
corn are devoted to ethanol, there is less corn to export and it is more expensive.
There is also less corn available to feed livestock or to turn into food products, so
13.
See
The
Modern
Scottish
Jury
in
Criminal
Trials,
SCOTTISH
GOV’T,
https://www2.gov.scot/Publications/2008/09/17121921/9 (last updated Sept. 17, 2008) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492 (2007).
15. See James M. Griffin & Mauricio Cifuentes Soto, The Unintended Consequences of America’s Ethanol
Policy, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (May 4, 2012), https://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/The-unintendedconsequences-of-America-s-ethanol-3535969.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).

830

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51
corn prices rise and food becomes more expensive.16 In the U.S., we only spend
11.4% of our disposable income on food and we have options if food prices
rise—we can substitute cheaper foods.17 But, in developing countries, food
absorbs 40% of a person’s disposable income, and there are often no less
expensive substitutes.18
Incentivizing the growing of corn has serious negative consequences for
the environment. One of the most serious is the effect on our rivers by nitrates
from fertilizers needed to raise corn.19 When there is a lot of rain in the Midwest,
the nitrates reach the Mississippi, increasing the algae bloom in the Gulf of
Mexico which is now the size of Massachusetts.20 Rising corn prices around the
world also encourages deforestation as countries try to raise their own corn.21
In June, 2018, the Environmental Protection Agency issued a longdelayed report entitled Biofuels and the Environment: The Second Triennial
Report to Congress.22 The report concluded that ethanol derived from corn and
soybeans is harming soil and land use, water quality, and air quality.23
The disastrous effect of our ethanol program is one example of what
economists term “the law of unintended consequences.” The law of unintended
consequences warns that any government action, no matter how well intended,
may have consequences that overwhelm the benefits that the law sought to
achieve.
The Supreme Court is not immune from the law of unintended
consequences and—for the reasons mentioned above, such as the Court’s limited
data on issues before it—the risks of something turning out wrong are greater
than they are for legislation. This is where we are today. The Warren Court took
major risks in issuing sweeping rulings intended to improve our criminal justice
system. In retrospect, such reforms were always going to be a high-risk endeavor
and the criminal procedure revolution contributed to our present incarceration
problem.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Renee Choo, Ethanol’s Impacts on Our Water Resources, COLUMBIA UNIV. (Mar. 21, 2011),
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2011/03/21/ethanol’s-impacts-on-our-water-resources (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
20. Id.
21.
See
Biofuels
Menace
Rainforests,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Aug.
17,
2007),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2007/aug/17/biofuelsmenacerainforests (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
22. See Biofuels and the Environment: The Second Triennial Report to Congress, EPA (June 29, 2018),
https://cfpub.epa.gov/si/si_public_record_report.cfm?Lab=IO&dirEntryId=341491 (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
23. Jonathan Lewis, EPA’s Report on the Environmental Impact of Biofuels, CLEAN AIR TASK FORCE (Oct.
4, 2019), https://www.catf.us/2018/07/epa-report-environmental-impacts-biofuels/ (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).

831

2020 / The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRIALS
A. The Disappearance of Trials
In 2004, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section on Litigation—
alarmed by the decline in trials in U.S. courtrooms—financed a major project
appropriately entitled The Vanishing Trial. The project studied the alarming
decline of trials held in U.S. courts from many different angles.24 More than 400
pages of articles were published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.25 The
data highlighted not only a startling decrease in the percentage of cases that go to
trial, but also a decrease in the absolute number of trials. The study noted more
trials took place in U.S. courtrooms in the 1960s and 1970s than take place in
courtrooms today despite increased numbers of trial judges in most
jurisdictions.26
The phenomenon affects both civil and criminal trials. But in the civil
area, several ways are available to resolve cases short of trial that allow the
parties to present their side of the issues but spare them the enormous strains and
costs of trial.
But in the criminal area, it is plea bargaining that resolves all but a small
handful of criminal cases. Today the plea-bargaining rate is 97% or 98% in most
jurisdictions.
Our federal system, once a model for the states in the way things should
be done, is a sad example of the decline in criminal trials. The ABA’s report on
the vanishing trial found that although the number of judges doubled between
1962 and 2002, the absolute number of criminal trials declined 30% between
1962 and 2002.27
State systems are no better. The plea-bargaining rates also hover close to
98% in most states and trials have become rare. Concerns also exists regarding
the types of cases that actually go to trial. There is the worry that we are not
trying the cases that should go to trial: the close cases where defendants have a
colorable defense. Instead, cases are tried because no plea bargain is possible
because the defendant will receive a mandatory life sentence no matter what or
because there are other reasons why the defendant simple can’t afford a
conviction.
The dearth of trials is hardly a secret. In 2016, The New York Times
detailed the absence of trials in an article entitled, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed
American Right, Is Vanishing.28 The article focused on the Southern District of
24. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. OF EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 459, 459–60 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 500, 516.
27. Id. at 493, 500.
28. Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing,, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-
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New York, which is often considered the most prestigious of the federal district
court benches in the country.29
The article stated that in 2015 a bench with forty district court judges
heard only fifty criminal trials that year.30 The article mentioned one judge who
had presided over only four criminal trials in six years on the bench and another
judge who has not had a criminal trial for eighteen months. The article states that
the plea-bargaining rate in federal courts in 1970 was roughly 80% meaning that
80% of convictions came from plea bargains.31 That plea-bargaining rate today is
97%.32 Trials have indeed vanished.
The federal court system has few cases compared to state court systems,
with talented prosecutors and defense attorneys, and with excellent judges who
have lifetime appointments. The federal system is also supported with
tremendous resources and could afford many more trials than occur today,33 but
its courtrooms are usually dark.
B. The Effects of Trials on Charging
In criminal cases, we tend to think of the investigating officers and the
prosecutor as working together and “on the same side,” which is probably a fair
assessment when a case is at the trial stage. But, in every country with a strong
trial system, there is considerable tension between the police and the prosecuting
authority when it comes to deciding which cases to pursue. This is true whether
the person filing the charges is referred to as “the Crown” (Canada), the “state’s
attorney” (Norway), the “Crown prosecutor” (England), or the “procurator fiscal”
(Scotland).
There is tension over the filing of charges because the police and
prosecutors have different perspectives on charging. The police want the cases
they have worked on and solved—cleared cases—prosecuted. They know who
committed the crime and want to see their work rewarded: the perpetrator tried,
convicted, and punished.
But, prosecutors only want to prosecute strong cases—those where they
can confidently prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not an easy standard. This
will be particularly the case with felonies. It may be that the person the police
want prosecuted has done similar things in the past, but the prosecutor may doubt
the admissibility of these prior acts. Or in some cases the trial may present the
doors.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See generally Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 117–21 (2005) (highlighting how professor Ronald Wright crunches the numbers on cases
in federal courts per district judge and finds that the caseload rise over the last few decades was modest and not
sufficient to explain the sharp rise in the guilty plea rate).
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jury with two different accounts of the incident—a claimed assault, for example,
where the defendant claims self-defense. Even though the prosecutor finds the
victim’s testimony completely convincing, she may choose not to prosecute
without additional evidence corroborating the victim’s account. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is a high standard and it should force prosecutors to be selective
in choosing those cases they will pursue.
In understanding the messiness of criminal cases and the problems of
proof that can occur, it is important to distinguish the different nature of cases in
state courts from those in federal courts. In state courts, unlike crimes in federal
courts, many cases are interpersonal, meaning that defendants and victims that
had a prior relationship of some sort. This is certainly true in domestic violence,
child abuse, and sexual assault, but it is also true even of property crimes. What
looks like a burglary under the law may look quite different to a jury, especially
when the jury understands the victim owed money to the defendant or had taken
some of the defendant’s personal effects at a prior time.
Similarly, an assault case may look strong at first glance—the defendant
assaulted the victim as the victim exited a bar late at night. But it may turn out to
be an unsympathetic case for the prosecutor when she learns that the victim had
been taunting the defendant with racial or religious epithets in the bar and had
resisted calls to stop from D and other patrons.
One might think that the way to handle problematic cases like these
would be to charge the defendant with the crime but offer a lenient plea bargain
to dispose of the case. But these are the cases that don’t plea bargain if trial is a
realistic option because defense attorneys can see the problems with the case.
This is, of course, a generalization as there are serious crimes, such as
homicides, rapes, and serious assaults where prosecutors will be under pressure
to file charges even though the case has some problems. But, many routine
criminal cases—burglaries, possessions of stolen goods, simple assaults, and
thefts—will not be prosecuted if they are not very strong cases. Prosecutors do
not want to prepare for and devote a week to a trial only to see the jury return a
“not guilty” verdict. There are always plenty of stronger cases to pursue.
But, when trials are not an option because the prosecutor has ways to
force the defendant to accept a plea bargain—such as the availability of charges
with high mandatory minimum sentences—this healthy tension between the
police and prosecutors over charging disappears. Prosecutors can charge crimes
that would be hard to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial because the
defendant cannot afford the risk of trial. This is the reality of the criminal justice
system in the United States, which unfortunately contributes to our high
incarceration rate. The realistic possibility of a trial imposes a discipline on the
system that is missing when trials vanish.
Not only do strong trial systems keep “weak” cases from being
prosecuted, they force prosecutors to make hard choices among the crimes that
will be prosecuted and those that will be handled in other ways. With respect to
minor crimes, such as misdemeanors, a strong trial system encourages cities to
834
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look at other options for handling anti-social behaviors other than use the
criminal justice system.
I have used the term “strong trial systems” so let me explain what this
means. A strong trial system needs three attributes: (1) it must have fair
procedures; (2) it must produce reliable verdicts in which the public can have
confidence; and (3) it must make efficient use of its resources.
Fair procedures seem basic to any system—the system needs to have
procedures that allow relevant evidence to be gathered, to be admitted at trial,
and to be tested. Thus, if a system does not permit indigent defendants access to
scientific experts or if a system allows prosecutors to keep helpful evidence from
the defense, we would not consider those procedures fair.
But, fair procedures are insufficient if the factfinders cannot be trusted to
understand the evidence and reach verdicts in which we have confidence.
Perfection in convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent is not attainable in
any system, but in strong trial systems miscarriages of justice are rare and can be
rectified without damaging the wronged individual.
Finally, trial systems need to be efficient to be strong. This is, of course,
a relative concept; there will be trials that may turn on complex issues with
multiple defendants that may take months to complete. But whatever procedure a
country adopts for its trials, one would hope that it makes efficient use of what
will always be limited resources.
These issues are obviously related. If you have fair procedures, but they
are extremely complicated, that may impact the system’s efficiency. If trials are
lengthy that may impact reliability as factfinders may have trouble remembering
and putting together information gained over several days or weeks or sometimes
months.
The United States lacks a strong trial system. One can see clear evidence
of this in the systematic avoidance of trials in the federal system and state
systems.
In the New York Times article mentioned above on the dearth of trials in
the Southern District of New York, many judges say the “right” things—how it is
a shame to be losing trials as they expose the working of the system to the public.
But, the reality is that federal judges do not want trials any more than state
judges.
Between 2006 and 2016, the number of criminal trials in federal courts
declined 47%.34 In 2015, out of 81,000 federal criminal cases, there were only
1,759 trials.35 The trial rate was thus 2%. This time period occurred after the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines were made advisory,36 which freed judges
34. See Robert J. Conrad & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to
Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 104 (2018).
35. Id.
36. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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Guidelines’ sentencing strictures. (Judges depart from the Guidelines’ ranges in
more than 50% of sentencings.37 ) Some predicted the ability of judges to
sentence more freely would lead to a sharp rise in the number of trials. Instead,
the trial rate continued to decline. Without trials, there are no brakes on charging
decisions.
III. MANDATING JURY TRIALS FOR MISDEMEANOR CASES
A. Baldwin v. New York
In Duncan v. Louisiana,38 the Supreme Court extended the right to jury
trial to felony cases. Duncan was an iconic case of the civil rights era with Gary
Duncan and a courageous team of lawyers challenging the staunchly
segregationist establishment in Plaquemines Parish, a parish located fifty miles
south of New Orleans.39 In the course of ruling that Duncan’s felony conviction
for assault was unconstitutional because he had been denied a jury trial, the Court
ruled that jury trials were required for “serious crimes,” but it left to another day
the precise line that would separate “serious crimes” requiring a jury and “petty
offenses” where no jury would be required.40
In 1970, in Baldwin v. New York,41 the Court set out to resolve the
constitutionality of trials without juries in misdemeanor cases. The case arose
because New York City did not provide jury trials to defendants charged with
misdemeanors, and Robert Baldwin—who had been charged with a
pickpocketing offense of “jostling”—had been convicted without a jury and
sentenced to a year in jail.42
New York City presented a stark contrast to Plaquemines Parish, the
venue of Gary Duncan’s trial. The New York county District Attorney’s Office
in the late 1960’s had long been considered one of the finest prosecutorial offices
in the country.43 Prosecutors, including Thomas Dewey, Frank Hogan, and later
Robert Morgenthau, in that office not only handled the sort of high volume
crimes that plague any major city, but they undertook important investigations of
political corruption, organized crime, and white collar crime.

37. See Conrad & Clements, supra note 33, at 131.
38. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
39. See NANCY J. KING, Duncan v. Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of
State Juries, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW STORIES (C. Steiker, ed. Foundation Press 2006).
40. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161.
41. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).)
42. Id. at 67.
43. See Chip Brown, Cyrus Vance, Jr.’s ‘Moneyball’ Approach to Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/magazine/cyrus-vance-jrs-moneyball-approach-to-crime.html (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that Frank Hogan, the District Attorney in New York City for
more than 30 years, was known as “Mr. Integrity”).
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The Legal Aid Society in New York City, with roots back to 1876, was
one of the first legal defense institutions in the country dedicated to representing
indigent clients44 and was equally respected for the quality of its work in both
civil and criminal cases.
Finally, the New York City Bar Association had a long history of taking
aggressive positions in reports, studies, and amicus briefs against injustice, not
just locally but nationally and even internationally.45
The plurality opinion of Justice White emphasized that New York City
was very much an outlier in denying jury trials to those charged with
misdemeanors.46 Justice White noted that all states provided jury trials for
misdemeanors and he noted that even in New York state other cities—and he
cited Buffalo and Albany—provided jury trials in misdemeanor cases.47
Against this background, White concluded that “this near-uniform
judgment of the Nation” required that the line for requiring jury trials be
extended to offenses carrying a possible sentence of more than six months.48
White’s opinion made New York City seem grudging and unfair for not
following the practices of other states and other big cities in granting jury trials in
misdemeanor cases, but New York City was in a very different situation from
other cities in New York, and was likely in a very different position from other
large cities like Chicago or Los Angeles. To understand the special nature of
criminal courts in New York City, one only has to reflect on the fact that the New
York City Criminal Court which handles misdemeanors had, at the time of
Baldwin, a case load docket that was 39 times greater than that of Buffalo, New
York’s second largest city.49
Many of the weaknesses of constitutional rulemaking described in
Section I were present in Baldwin. There is no statistical analysis comparing New
York City to other major American cities. One would have liked to have seen a
comparison of misdemeanor caseloads in New York City compared to other large
cities, the number of trials in each city, and the plea-bargaining rate to see if
those cities were providing anywhere near the number of misdemeanor trials that
New York City provided. It might have been the case that New York City gave
many more defendants a chance to put on a defense at trial, whereas other cities
offered jury trials in theory but not nearly the percentage in practice as New York
City.

44. See The History of the Legal Aid Society, THE LEGAL AID SOCIETY, http://www.legalaid.org/en/las/aboutus/ourhistory.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (showing that The Legal Aid Society traces its roots back to 1876).
45. See generally, About the New York City Bar Association, NEW YORK CITY BAR,
http://www.nycbar.org/about-us/overview-about-us (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing the history of the New York City Bar Association).
46. Id. at 71–72.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 72.
49. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 135 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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White’s analysis in Baldwin is also missing any reference to the history
and scope of the right to jury trials from England. In Duncan, by contrast, White
quoted from Blackstone’s Commentaries, written in the mid-18th century, on the
importance of jury trials as a protection against the Crown.50 White also noted in
Duncan the distinguished pedigree of jury trials in England stretching back even
to the Magna Carta.51
But, the Court never looked beyond our borders in Baldwin, likely
because you will not find jury trials for misdemeanors in England. Jury trials
which take place in Crown Courts52 have a long history in England but so do
magistrates’ courts which go back over 250 years and handle misdemeanors and
even minor felonies without juries.53 Canada also does not grant defendants a
right to jury trial in misdemeanor case.54 Both England and Canada have much
lower incarceration rates than the United States. Might there be a connection?
But whether or not New York City was exceptional in denying
defendants jury trials for misdemeanors, the issue is whether the trials it provided
were fair, which plenty of evidence shows they were fair.
First of all, misdemeanor defendants in New York City had the right to
ask for a trial in front of a panel of three judges. Thus they had some protection
against the “bias and compliant judge” about which the Court worried in Duncan.
Justice Harlan noted in dissent in Baldwin that the AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRIAL BY JURY had
suggested this might be a possible compromise where jury trials are not permitted
or are waived.55 But the Court brushed this protection aside, insisting it is
necessary to interpose
. . .between the accused and his accuser the judgment of laymen
who are less tutored than a judge or a panel of judges, but who,
at the same time, are less likely to function or appear to function
as but another arm of the Government that has proceeded against
him”56

50. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 349–50 (Cooley ed. 1899)).
51. Id. at 151.
52. See Criminal Courts, GOV. UK, https://www.gov.uk/courts (last visited Apr. 3, 2020) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. See id. (noting that one of the most famous magistrates’ courts was the Bow Street Magistrates Court
in central London which existed for more than 250 years; its work has now been taken over by a set of four
Magistrates’ Courts).
54. See LORI HAUSEGGER, MATTHEW HENNIGAR, AND TROY RIDDELL, CANADIAN COURTS: LAW,
POLITICS, AND PROCESS 35 (2009).
55. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 71 n. 16 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
56. Id. at 72 (majority opinion).
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Secondly, the dissent also noted that the acquittal rate in criminal courts
handling misdemeanors in New York City was reported to be 49%.57 This
suggests judges were doing what they should have been doing and were not
rubber-stamping prosecutions. White’s opinion never dealt with this issue.
Nor did the Court address another important issue: (1) what are the likely
consequences of requiring jury trials in terms of the availability of trials? And,
(2) what is the tradeoff in the number of trials? In 1967, the year before Baldwin
was decided, the New York Criminal Court provided more than 5,000 trials
resulting in 3,023 convictions and 2,678 acquittals.58 In 2014, the New York City
Criminal Court with 100 judges handled 252,741 misdemeanor cases.59 Of those,
580 eventually went to trial (175 were jury trials), or less than a quarter of 1
percent.60 Like most urban misdemeanor courts, New York City’s criminal courts
are mills churning out conviction after conviction. The courts mark too many
citizens with a conviction that will greatly complicate their lives—they may lose
employment or a chance for future employment.
How does Baldwin affect charging decisions? With no advantage in
keeping charges at the misdemeanor level, won’t prosecutors charge felonies if
that is an option? John Pfaff, an economist at Fordham Law School, who has
written extensively on the causes of mass incarceration, concludes that “the
primary engine of prison growth has been an increased willingness on the part of
prosecutors to file felony charges.”61 Baldwin plays a role in those charging
decisions. It is time to ask: Did Baldwin make defendants better off or far worse
off?
IV. CONCLUSION
The criminal procedure revolution took almost all Bill of Rights
protections intended for the federal system and applied them equally to state
systems without taking the differences into account. State systems have more
cases, they have more violent crimes, they have more interpersonal crimes, and
they have vastly more minor criminal cases. The procedures that apply to federal
cases—serious, often highly complex cases—are unworkable for minor criminal
cases.
A sad commentary on the state of affairs in misdemeanor courts is a
report put together by public defenders in the Bronx (a borough of New York

57. Id. at 136 n. 16 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
58. Id.
59. See CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK CITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2014 27 (2014), available at
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
60. Id.
61. See John F. Pfaff, Escaping from the Standard Story: Why the Conventional Wisdom on Prison Growth
Is Wrong, and Where We Can Go From Here, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 265, 268 (2014).
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City) entitled, No Day in Court.62 The report describes what happened to a cohort
of 54 marijuana possession cases in the period between March 2011 and March
2012. The public defenders and their clients wished to take these cases to trial
because they thought they were winnable.
The title sums up what unfolded. Even though the defendants wanted to
challenge the charges against them not a single suppression hearing was ever
completed. Eventually, the majority of the defendants were simply worn down by
the process and accepted conditional release agreements or pleas to disorderly
conduct charges. Approximately 30% of the cases were eventually dismissed
outright. But those defendants paid a price because it took on average five court
appearances and 270 days to get the cases dismissed.63
The report details the toll the process exacted on defendants as they were
required to return to the courthouse again and again to await hearings that rarely
took place:
After making it into the courthouse, they must wait, sometimes
for hours, in crowded courtrooms, where judges frequently hear
in excess of 100 cases a day, before having their cases called.
And because prosecutors rarely reveal whether they will state
“ready” for hearings and trial until the case is called on the
record, the wait is colored by anxiety and uncertainty.
Beyond the physical and psychological toll exacted by these
delays, each postponement brings with it the potential for
another missed day of work, lost wages, school absence,
rescheduled medical appointment, financial hardship, or
childcare emergency. Clients must pay for transportation to and
from court.
Repeated absences from work strain relationships with current
employers, and potential employers are less likely to hire clients
when a background check reveals a pending criminal case.
Clients working in the public sector or in jobs requiring stateissued licenses—such as security guards, home health aides, or
cab drivers—are especially vulnerable, as an open case may lead
to an immediate suspension without pay and, ultimately,
termination.64

62. No Day in Court, THE BRONX DEFENDERS 1 (May 1, 2013), https://www.bronxdefenders.org/no-dayin-court-a-new-report-by-the-bronx-defenders/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 12.
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It is fair to put a share of the blame for No Day in Court on the
prosecutors and judges. It is also fair to see what happened as revealing serious
problems with the speedy trial statute in New York. But a share of the blame
stems from the Court’s decision to expand the right to jury trial to minor criminal
cases. Complicated and expensive trial procedures can be a weapon that wealthy
and sophisticated defendants can sometimes use to wear down prosecutors and
judges. But complicated and expensive trial procedures can also be a weapon that
prosecutors and judges can use to wear down defendants who are poor and
powerless.
If we wish to lower our incarceration rate significantly, we have to start
talking critically about some of the major planks of the criminal procedure
revolution, no matter how painful the conversation.
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